Triumphalism and Desperation, or, “To What May October 7 be Compared?”:

Is October 7 the End of an Era that Began in June 1967

The further one gets from a moment in history, including a catastrophe, the more one begins to think about it comparatively. The Holocaust is a great example. Richard Rubenstein published After Auschwitz in 1966 sparking a scholarly subdiscipline of “post-Holocaust theology” that included a debate about the Holocaust’s uniqueness. This inspired thinking about the Holocaust and its implications for Jewish theology and history for decades. If there are two people, one who believes the Holocaust was unique and the other who doesn’t, when they discuss the Holocaust together, they are essentially discussing two different things.

Are we moving to the point where we can think about October 7 and its implications? If so, to borrow a midrashic phrase, “to what can it be compared?” One obvious place to begin would be with the Six Day War in June 1967. In what ways are October 7 and the Six-Day War different, and in what ways are they similar? In what ways does 1967 inform October 7, and in what ways does it disprove 1967? There are some similarities; the brevity, six days and one day, and the unexpected consequences, albeit in opposite directions. As is the case with comparison’s more generally, the differences are what makes comparisons interesting to think with. As we know, in May 1967 Jews were preparing for a possible second Holocaust. Mass graves were dug in Israel to prepare for many casualties. The fear was palpable, “maybe this is the end, a state that lasted a mere twenty years?”.

What happened in June 1967 could not have been imagined a week before. Israel not only defended herself against formidable enemies, but it captured territory that increased its size by one third and thereby created a security buffer it claimed to desperately need. In addition, it captured land (liberated or occupied depends on your politics) with religious significance, amplifying messianic expectations. It thus constituted a secular victory as well as a theological one. Each one of us will decide for themselves whether that war was a “miracle” (Israeli philosopher Ernst Akiba Simon once said, “I too would believe the Six Day War was a miracle, if I didn’t believe in God so much”) but it certainly was fortuitous. And it constituted a significant defeat for Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Israel took advantage of the opportunity, and over the next decades tacitly enabled the construction of a subculture in those “occupied” territories, settling over 500,000 civilians there (if we include East Jerusalem). That project, and arguably the ideology called “Greater Israel” that it represented, has now come, in one way or another, to dominate the country, religious and secular.

In short, the settlers waged a decisive and tactical battle for control of the country and have largely won. This is not because of what Netanyahu or Ben Gvir say, it is because of what Ganz or Lapid or Bennet say. For example, the protests in Israel against government reform were not essentially about what 1967 wrought. The occupation was not really on the agenda. For many, not all, in the Israeli protest movement, the occupation ceased being a moral blemish and became a (tragic) necessity.

I understand the animus toward Netanyahu, and I understand the settlers support of him. Like a person who doesn’t think the Holocaust was unique cannot easily speak about the Holocaust to a person who does, so too, supporters Netanyahu and those who oppose him arguably do not share basic premises sufficient to be talking about the same thing.

The religious Zionist message is pretty straightforward. Basically, according to Rav Shagar, as he defines it in his sermon delivered on Israel Independence Day 1997, “Land and Exile and the Pursuit of Peace,” Zionism as an ingathering of the Jews to the land of Israel is part of a messianic process (broadly defined), the state has religious value, in one form or another the state is fulfilling a prophetic promise, and I would add, all of the land, from the river to the sea, belongs to the Jews, what Israeli historian Chaim Gans calls “proprietary Zionism.” Whatever decision Israel chooses to make viz. a now largely defunct “two-state solution,” it is a compromise. To them the land, - all of it - belongs to the Jews.

Many religious Zionists interpret these in different – sometime very different – ways, and come to different conclusions or alternatives. But I still think most adhere to these principles. Those advocating for a truly secular democratic state, a state that grants all those in-residence full and equal rights and privileges begin with different premises and thus are talking about a different vision for the country. This debate has been a real struggle in Israel for decades. In fact, one can argue it had its genesis in 1967.

One of the reasons settlers succeeded in 1968 in Sebastia (an abandoned railway station near Ramallah where a small group of settlers set up camp and refused to leave) and then in Hebron (where a small group led by Moshe Levinger rented a hotel in Hebron for Passover and then never left) was because they knew exactly what they wanted, and the government didn’t know what it wanted. Members of this small settler movement slowly, strategically, and brilliantly kept going, founding Gush Emunim in the winter of 1974, often tactically regulated themselves, while subrosa their ideology was developing and evolving in response to changing circumstances and realities.

In 1984 the settler movement experienced a setback when the Jewish underground’s plan to blow up the Dome of Rock Mosque was discovered and many were arrested and imprisoned, mostly for short sentences that were later commuted. And of course, Baruch Goldstein’s 1994 murder of 29 Muslim worshippers in Hebron on Purim morning, and Yitzhak Rabin’s assassination in 1995 sent shockwaves through the settler community, with many thinking this was a sign of its demise. But it recalibrated and survived. And grew. That has been the root of its great success. It has been cultivating a quiet revolution for almost half a century, slowly making its way into the mainstream. People will counter that this was because of Palestinian resistance which of course is partly true. But I find that obfuscating. Israel is a sovereign state. And sovereign states are not, or perhaps should not be, totally reactive. That is part of the responsibility of sovereignty.

With the Gaza disengagement in 2005, the settler movement suffered its greatest challenge, which crippled it, but instead of surrendering it broke into various factions. The Hilltop Youth, many of them “children of the disengagement” chose lawlessness, in effect abandoning Zionism and becoming Erez Yisraelists, a fascinating iteration of nativism that Yonatan Ratosh spoke about in a very secular register the 1940s. I think Ratosh was only partly right. Ratosh argued that a native Hebrew culture/civilization will eventually emerge, Ratosh argued, distinct from Jews and Judaism in the Diaspora, in fact severed from it, but he thought it would abandon Judaism, whereas in fact the Hilltop Youth have adopted Judaism into a kind of neo-Biblicism. They have become shepherds and artisans on the land.

Another faction, that has now become the Religious Zionist party, began to work its way into government institutions, and in November 2022 achieved a victory few could have conceived a few years before. Meir Kahane was removed from the Knesset in 1986 with a “Racism Law” and now those who openly support many of his views, are at the very center of power in the Knesset. In some way, with all the ups and downs, November 2022 was the apex of June 1967.

Then came October 7. Whereas in June 1967 Israel overestimated its adversaries, thinking the Arab armies could inflict serious, perhaps even fatal, damage, on October 7 Israel underestimated its adversity (Hamas) not believing it had the resources, skill, or fortitude to wage such an attack. If 1967 was an exhibition of Israeli grit, courage, and devotion, October 7 was an exhibition of Israeli arrogance, failure, and disorganization. For example, the fact that there was a music rave with thousands of civilians a few kilometers from an enemy border with almost no security. What was behind such a decision to pull security (especially given that there was military intelligence that Hamas was planning something) if not a deep underestimation of Hamas’ capabilities? And as to why it took the IDF, a military that prided itself on capability and readiness, six or seven hours to respond, is something that needs an investigation that will likely come out in time.

In June 1967 Israel celebrated mass death averted, and on October 7 they mourned mass death realized. The strength of June 1967 gave Israel the confidence of a functioning regional power that could negotiate a deal with neighboring countries from a pace of strength, whereas October 7 humiliated Israel into reacting with vengeance, essentially destroying Gaza. I see this not as an exhibition of strength but weakness, since as vengeance is an expression of weakness disguised as strength.

June 1967 brought Jews worldwide together, creating a pride in Israel previously only matched by 1948, perhaps even more so. It essentially erased the remaining ambivalence many Jews held about Zionism. October 7 has torn world Jewry apart, created animus and even hatred among Jews who support the war and those who oppose it. Calling Jews who oppose the Gaza War “pro-Hamas,” and creating documents suggesting those who strongly criticize Israel, even Jews, are guilty of “antisemitism.” And alternatively, calling anyone who defends the war, “fascist.”

I am suggesting that what was created in June 1967 totyally imploded on October 7. I frame this as a difference between triumphalism and desperation. June 1967 was a triumphalist moment for many Jews. It was, in some way, a collective exhale from the Holocaust. It is therefore not coincidental that October 7 was compared to the Holocaust (erroneously in my view). If the victory in 1967 “proved” to many Jews that they had the wherewithal to avert any future Holocaust by having a sovereign state, October 7 tragically exhibited how that was false. The entire project of Zionism was arguably created so that October 7 could never happen, not that an enemy could never attack (that is always possible) - and Israel could defend its civilians in any attack.

This is why I am suggesting that Israel’s reaction, on the ground and rhetorically, is best described as desperation. Its desperation, in one sense, is the opposite of the triumphalism of 1967. The triumphalism of 1967 was an expression of relief, the desperation of October 7 is an expression of humiliation. In 1967 we were frightened and worried, rightfully so, and we reacted with courage and resolve. In 2023 we were overconfident, even arrogant, and we acted with dismissal. In 1967 our resolve resulted in perseverance; in 2023 our overconfidence resulted in mass death. To repeat, as we move further away from that horrific moment, “to what can October 7 be compared?”

*

I submit that in myriad ways the era that began in June 1967 ended on October 7. The broad assumption in the 1970s through the 2020s was that the occupation could be “managed.” October 7 showed us that this is no longer the case, if it ever was. The notion of “mowing the lawn” (a grotesque racist image in my view) where every once in a while, the IDF goes into Gaza, kills some terrorists, and leaves, has been debunked. I think this war against Gaza illustrates that. It is a war of almost total destruction; it is no longer “mowing the lawn,” it is obliterating the entire region. This itself, in my view, exhibits how those in power believe that the rules of the game have changed. I don’t think this resolves anything, but it certainly changes the dynamic. Without the recognition that what began in 67 ended on October 7, I think we are simply buying time until another October 7.

But here I think there are similarities between the post 67 world and our moment. The settler movement remains resolute in their program. Now they have security jurisdiction in the West Bank to act in concert with the government. And the IDF is doing the settler movement’s bidding in Gaza. The center, however, like in 67, doesn’t know quite what to do. The ambivalence is as palpable as it is dangerous. And that is why the settlers will likely win. What that will mean remains to be seen, but just as Israel became a different country after 1967 it may do so once again after October 7, perhaps in the same direction only more draconian.

For those who often say to me, “well, what is the solution?” my response is that not everything has a solution. In this paradigm, the paradigm that began in 1967, there is no solution. For there to be a solution the paradigm would have to change. And that is no easy task after half a century of investment, false hopes and broken promises, and incompetence. People from Ben Gurion to Yeshayahu Leibowitz, to say nothing of the real left, warned us of the dangers of occupation back in the late 1960s. At the time, triumphalism, optimism, and relief, made it impossible to hear. And now, perhaps, it is too late.

The ideological product of a small band of messianic nationalists who camped on the hilltops of Judea, mostly to the curiosity of Israeli society, now run the country under the guise of “security.” How they can say that with a straight face after October 7 is beyond me. “Total victory,” is a ruse, a mantra to lull us into a hypnotic state to enable us not to go mad at what we are doing.

At any rate, the Palestinians have shown the world, like the American slave population before them (no comparison intended), that eventually if pushed far enough, they will find a way to resist and incur serious damage on their oppressors. I am not justifying, I am describing. The slave revolt leader Nat Turner and Yahya Sinwar come from similar mindsets.

One question we can ask is whether we can transition from humiliation and desperation to think about a future for Israel outside the false narrative 1967 provided. One who looks at October 7 from the paradigm of 1967, and one who looks at October 7 as the undoing of 1967, are looking at two different things. The Six-Day War lasted only six days, but it reverberated for over half a century. October 7 is its inverted finale.

Shaul

• With thanks to Jeanette Friedman